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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the State of Utah's right to the subject property did not vest before
expiration of the 1974 judgment, the State of Utah lost its right to the subject property.
This means that the trial court erred in upholding the recording of an expired judgment.
This Court should find that the law in Utah is that expired judgments cannot be recorded
against real property. In addition, this Court should find that adverse possession against
the State of Utah is available in certain circumstances and that this matter should be
remanded to the trial court for a trial on the adverse possession issues. Finally, if the
Court disagrees with Appellant on the previous two issues, then the Court should exercise
its equitable powers requiring that the State of Utah reimburse Appellant for all property
taxes paid to Weber County for the years that the State failed to record its judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE STATE OF UTAH'S RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
njn TVQT VEST BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE JUDGMENT, THE STATE
OF UTAH LOST ITS RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY.
A.

VESTING OF THE STATE'S REAL PROPERTY RIGHT DID NOT
OCCUR BEFORE THE 1974 JUDGMENT EXPIRED.

The central issue in this case is whether or not the State can record an expired
judgment to vest property for which a condemnation judgment had been entered in 1974.
The conclusion should be and is that the recording of an expired judgment is invalid.
The trial court found that the applicable statute which was enforceable at the time
of the 1974 condemnation judgment essentially states that vesting occurs at the time of

i

recording. See, Decision dated July 2, 2007 pp. 4-5 attached to Appellant's Opening
Brief as Appendix 4. See also, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 formerly codified at
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15. The trial court, however, did not construe this statute
properly in light of the fact that judgments in Utah expire after eight years. Because the
judgment expired eight years after entry, there were no rights to vest in the State of Utah
when the judgment was finally recorded in 2003. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516
(previously encoded as Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15) provides as follows concerning
condemnation vesting procedures:
When payments have been made and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects
to give one, as required by § 78-34-13 and § 78-34-14, the court must make
a final judgment of condemnation, which must describe the property
condemned and the purpose of such condemnation. A copy of the
judgment must be filed in the office of the recorder of the county,
thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the Plaintiff for the
purpose therein specified. [Emphasis added].
Thus, the simple statutory language from 1974 (and which basically continues
today at § 78B-6-516) is that the property under a condemnation action does not vest in
the State of Utah until the condemnation judgment is recorded. This is a statutory vesting
requirement.

The trial court erred in not enforcing this requirement. The trial court

construed the statutes erroneously.

A proper interpretation of the case law and the

statutes is that the recording of a judgment after eight years is ineffective. Surely this
court would not approve of the enforceability of the recordation of any other judgment
which was recorded beyond the eight year period. This would have the effect of making
a judgment enforceable beyond the initial eight year period. The deadline for recording
the judgment must necessarily be the effective date of the judgment which is eight years.

The State of Utah had the option of either recording the judgment within the eight year
period or renewing that judgment with a new lawsuit for further enforcement before the
expiration of the eight year period. Neither of these events occurred.
The State has failed to address this argument at each stage of this action. The
State has offered no explanation as to why the judgment was not recorded in Weber
County while it was recorded in Davis County. Obviously, the State knew that it had to
record the document because it did so in Davis County. Whether the State deliberately
failed to record the document or whether the State accidentally failed to record the
document is unknown because the trial court made its ruling before the facts could be
discovered. However, the reason for non-recording is immaterial because the fact is that
the judgment was not recorded before the judgment expired.
It is longstanding law that the judgments in Utah are only valid for eight (8) years.
The recording of a stale judgment has no legal effect whatsoever. An interesting case
which discusses the eight year validity requirement and the eight (8) year statute of
limitation for renewing judgments is Fisher v. Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198 (Utah 2004). In that
case, the court discussed that judgments are valid in Utah for eight (8) years based upon
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 (predecessor to § 78B-5-202(l)). Thus, it is clear from
the Fisher case that judgments expire in Utah after eight (8) years. Id. at 1199-1200.
Another interesting case is Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App.
1999).

In Kessimakis the court found that attempts to enforce a divorce judgment

requiring execution and delivery of appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of an

interest were not enforceable after the eight (8) year statute of limitations, because the
judgment had expired.
"Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 (1987) establishes an eight (8) year statute of
limitations for the enforcement of judgments...^ See. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d
1142 (Utah, 1991).
judgment.

In addition, another case talks about the "statutory life" of a

See, Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988). In Cox Corp. the

Supreme Court of Utah found that a judgment lien cannot extend beyond the statutory life
of the judgment which is eight years and thus rejected a renewal of a judgment under the
applicable statues which include Utah Code Annotated § 78-22-1. Id. at 939.
In Potomac Leasing Company v. Pasco Technology Corporation, 10 P.3d 972
(Utah 2000) the court made it clear that judgments are valid and enforceable for eight (8)
years. The court further found that the registering or filing of a foreign judgment in Utah
is an wtaction" contrary to the assertions made by a party in that case.
In Gilroy v. Lowe. 626 P.2d 469 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court stated that
an execution sale on October 22, 1979 which related to a judgment issued on October 22,
1971 was timely because it occurred within eight (8) years after entry of judgment.
Execution on judgments cannot issue after the statutory period of eight (8) years has
lapsed. Therefore, recording should similarly not be available after eight years. An eight
year limitation on enforcement of judgments should apply to any action, including the act
of recording a judgment. Thus, all of the case law demonstrates that judgments are only
valid for eight years, and there is no exception for recordation. This Court should not
allow such because it would be contrary to case law and would have no precedent.

It is clear from the above analysis that each time that the Utah Supreme Court or
Utah Court of Appeals has discussed the issue of enforceability of judgments, they have
always limited the effectiveness of judgments in Utah to eight years. In its brief the
State of Utah asserts that the eight year period does not apply. This should not be the law
in Utah. The State should be responsible to follow its own procedures in condemnation
actions. The State has shown no rule, statute or case which shows that a judgment after
eight years is enforceable in any way including the recording thereof
In summary, condemnation actions require recording of the judgment before
actual vesting to the State of Utah. See, § 78B-6-516 formerly § 78-34-15. Even though
a judgment for condemnation had been entered, it is not the entry of the judgment which
transfers title but recording of the deed.

In other words, at the time that the State

obtained a condemnation judgment against Higley, the State was required to record the
judgment before vesting occurs. Judgments in Utah are good for eight (8) years. The
judgment was not recorded within eight (8) years, but rather was recorded in 2003,
approximately twenty-nine (29) years after the judgment had been obtained. This Court
should find that the recording of the judgment which had expired was ineffective as
against the title to the property held by Plaintiff at the time that the judgment was
recorded in Weber County.

The State did not follow the plain requirements of the

condemnation statute. Mr. Higley continued paying taxes on the property, continued
using the property and continued as the record owner of the property during all material
times until it passed to his heirs upon his death in 2002.

B.

THE STATE'S
ERRONEOUS.

INTERPRETATION

OF THE STATUTES IS

In its brief, the State of Utah characterizes the recording of the judgment as
"clerical".

However, Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-15 does not read as such. The

statute specifically requires the recording of the judgment before vesting occurs.
Obviously the State of Utah knew that it had to record the judgment because it recorded
the judgment in Davis County, but for whatever reason failed to record it in Davis
County. The vesting requirement failed as it relates to any property located in Weber
County because the State of Utah did not follow the statute by recording it in Weber
County. The State of Utah has not adequately responded to this argument and therefore
its argument fails. This is a simple statutory requirement that the State failed to fulfill,
and the legislature obviously deemed it important for the recording to occur which is a
material element of the condemnation process to notify others. Because it is statutorily
required it cannot be ignored.
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record judgments. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-202(7)(d). However, said statute was
only recently enacted in 2008 and does not have retroactive application in this situation.
Moreover, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-516 still requires recording. The law at the
time of entry of the judgment both in 1974 and at the time of expiration of the judgment
was that judgments are good for eight (8) years. The State had a duty to record the
judgment in order for title to vest and failed to comply with its vesting requirements and
therefore title to the property never transferred to the State of Utah.
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its opening brief that adverse possession can be obtained by a citizen against the State of
Utah.
In its brief, the State has failed to show why adverse possession should not be
applicable against the State given the current circumstances. Therefore, this Court should
find that the trial court should conduct a trial on the issue of adverse possession against
the State of Utah.
The State has cited to no Utah case law or statute which disallows adverse
possession against the State. There is a statute which specifically disallows adverse
possession against towns, cities, and counties. See, Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-216.
But this statute does not say anything about whether adverse possession can be obtained
against a State. It appears that this issue has not yet been addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court in its case law. The State of Utah relies upon the Nyman case and the Fries case.
However, neither of these cases are applicable because both of them discuss adverse
possession against a county, not against the state.
Annotated § 78B-2-216 is inapplicable to this case.

Thus, the statute at Utah Code
Said statute does not mention

anything about adverse possession against the state and no case law has definitively set
forth such a premise.
The State's brief focuses more on the alleged public purpose issue and does not
show how adverse possession, should not be allowed against the State of Utah.
Appellant's opening brief sets forth the fact that there is no Utah statute or case law
which absolutely disallows adverse possession against the State. Therefore, this Court
should apply a rule which balances the interests of the competing policies. The rule

siioiild be that when ihe Stale has not used iln- paKei 'hiea _ eotidemned lo: a public
purpose and for

possession.

V-IIKI.

a un.oi

IKIS

paid taxes continilously thereon for the statutory

I his should be espeeially true ioi this situation \viieic a was the State's

failure to record which ua\e rise to the issues so long ago.
Ill

• r »S2 . • . *,

FINDS , i C , Ill V'S I! \ I- Il EI .LAIN I ON I HE P K I . M i n I

^ «; I.VSUI^, A.PPEI .] \,N" I IS EN ITTEFD
REIMBl JRSEMENT El (( )M I HE S I A I E i;i
I P R O P E R I Y F A X E S P A I D FO W E B E R C O U N T Y .
This Court '-hoi:!.'1 r-;-C reach this issue ' r ; < '• K 'ae.:
'••=.•!?>•'

- .^JiLN L, ,;J- ,,|t

l

TO
*

?

E O l ' fTABLE
» <*«* AI ,1 ,

hai \ p p J C ; :• Ma*, e <

3

the event Lhat the Court reaches this issue., the Court should hud ihai \^

iu\ve\et. ai
iuuit i - uiak

J

to reimbursement from the State of I Mali f« all properh (axe- paid a \Vebei ( nimiy.
is ^itiiwul and because »>i UK- .ailare to
record which is the lailure ol the State ol Utah and mu mi- uuiuic i .
*MVT

p f o f p m o n K '

\\rc*m

iroiuvl

Ui

tu/\

Jiuiciin-iii.i

ivviw

Uiiu^vi

i»

p i - p e i; taxes, ai

\UaKot-

y\\^u\^L

f n n n h ;

f/^

'i ' \

\ 1 i r*\ c*<* r

^A;UIH>

IW

< ^

iiitiiv^Y.

!

l

i

,. j v

My
.

.-.,.,)

pin U

tU^ „ ^

LllV^DV^

- -.;.:;. ; . •. ;,;;i now asserts thai Ihe proper* \ neii'iie- - n- die State of

Utah. If iii (act this is the case, it is because oi

:

State of Utah should pay to The Estate of Edwin Iliglex die a; *ii.'ii «-i .ul :ne properl\
taxes paid over tin years as a resu

lie M a u .a * ..a.

f:»ii»-»--» *<> record

This j - the

only ec ]i ii table resi ill >vhi :li ; :ai I 11 : : ,)1 )taii iieel
Equitable priiiciples should bear m l a \ o r ol 1 he Estate of Edwin Hiizle\ f<v pa\ m^
all the property taxes over almost a thirt>" ^\<n peihul because the result »••: -ae p a \ m e n t of

9

the property taxes stems directly from the State of Utah's inaction. This Court should
direct the trial court to invoke its equitable powers to require such a payment by the State
of Utah to Appellant. Had the State of Utah recorded its judgment as required by statute,
this situation would not exist. Thus, on balance, the equities are in favor of Appellant for
reimbursement of all taxes paid since 1974.
CONCLUSION
Because the State of Utah's right to the subject property did not vest before
expiration of the 1974 judgment, the State of Utah lost its right to the subject property.
This means that the trial court erred in upholding the recording of an expired judgment.
This Court should find that the law in Utah is that expired judgments cannot be recorded
against real property. In addition, this Court should find that adverse possession against
the State of Utah is available in certain circumstances and that this matter should be
remanded to the trial court for a trial on the adverse possession issues. Finally, if the
/,rvii*>f

\^UUll

/A-tr^r^r>r+*f-\/-*Lm

Ul^agLLV^^

-\ ~t T % 4-V^

Willi

A t-»«Ar»l I n t - » f

/"v «-» f-k» <a n « « Q T H A I I P

/ - L p p \ ^ l l C U l l \^11 L l i ^ p l C V l U U O

f i l m

* o o l T <r» o

LVVU l ^ ^ U C J ,

fUr»n

f U r> I

r>iif+

LllV^li L l i ^ V ^ U U l l

o h r v i 1 1 /-J

OHVJU1U

r\-*rr^.**r^ir\r^

t A U t l D t

its equitable powers requiring that the State of Utah reimburse Appellant for all property
taxes paid to Weber County for the years that the State failed to record its judgment.
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